Controls are used to modify the behaviour of a system. Scheduling rules can realize fairness when working as controls of the whole system. In decentralized systems such schedules are possible only for individual agents, while global controls may be replaced by social laws, etc. The aim of the paper is to study the effects of combining controls at one hand, and of distributing global control goals at the other hand.
Introduction
Fairness is considered as freedom from starvation. This means that each (enabled) action will eventually proceed. Certain control is needed to ensure fairness in the case of conflicting actions. Appropriate scheduling policies (e.g. queues) can do the job. Usually, system properties may change in the presence of such controls. For example, liveness and safety properties may change, and the computational power of Petri Nets is extended to the power of counter automata [5] . This holds not only for fair controls, the same is true for maximal parallelism [24] , and for nearly all kinds of "essential" changes of the firing strategy in Petri nets (cf. [3, Theorem 7.41) .
Problems become much harder in the case of decentralized systems like open systems [15] or domains for agent oriented programming [25] . The subsystems are influencing (and restricting -or controlling) each other. Moreover, special control policies (e.g. for fairness) can work only locally, since there is no use of a global control regime for all actions of the whole system. The question is whether decentralized controls can realize fairness as well. I illustrate the problem with an example:
Each one of three robots a, b and c is to do repeatedly two private actions, say actions al and a2 are done by robot a, 61 and b2 are done by b, cl and c2 by c. To ensure fairness of these actions, each robot x may have to alternate while performing its actions nl and x2. Now suppose that there are conflicts: The actions al, bl and cl are performed using a hammer, while ~2, b2 and c2 require a spanner. If there are available only one hammer and only one spanner, then the robots are in conflicts. If robot a is the quickest one, it may always succeed in getting the necessary tool. If robot b is quicker than c, and if it is able to switch its desire to the just available tool, then it may also have the chance to work. (But some further assumptions concerning b are already introduced at this point!) At the end, it may be the case that c does not come to work.
It turns out, that additional assumptions are necessary for fairness. An additional schedule for the consecution (succession) of the robots, e.g. alternation of a, b and c, can be used to give each robot a chance. This leads to hierarchical controls as suggested in [7] , where fairness of the whole system is obtained by fair consecutions of the agents and fair behaviour of each individual agent (cf. Proposition 2 in this paper). This is related also to the use of the so-called "social laws" in agent societies [9, W. Further problems arise from cooperation and ordering requirements. Again, their realization by a global control of all actions of each agent is not possible, since this contradicts the idea of decentralization.
The question arises if those requirements can be met also by decentralized (individual) controls.
The following kinds of controls can be compared: (a) global system control of all actions of all agents, (b) global control of the consecutions of the agents, (c) individual controls for each agent, (d) hierarchical control as combination of (b) and (c).
In a related sense, the effects of the controls can be considered from the viewpoint of (a) the whole system (i.e. for all actions of all agents), (b) the consecutions of the agents, (c) each agent (i.e. for the corresponding individual actions). A series of questions is connected with these strategies and viewpoints. One can ask for an appropriate global control to obtain a special behaviour. Then the decisions made by this control can be distributed to individual decisions of the agents. The question arises, if this distribution works properly. Vice versa, one may start from individual controls realizing certain agent properties (e.g. fairness). Then the question is whether the combination of these controls meets the properties for the whole system (as the initial example shows, this need not be the case for fairness). Thus, it is necessary to study the effects of combination and of distribution for controls (where fairness may serve as an example).
The paper is organized as follows: First I give formal definitions of multi-agent systems, fair multi-agent systems and fair agents. Some results are cited from [7] .
Next I define what I call a control in this formalism. There are two approaches: The control can be introduced by its restriction of the original behaviour, and it can be defined as a choice for the next action regarding the history. At the first glance both approaches are equivalent, but going more into the details of control interference and behavioural changes, the both approaches are applicable in different ways.
Two kinds of fair controls can be considered. Since control is a restriction, fairness can be realized by fewer enabled actions (such that those actions are not considered as waiting). Since this may not meet the real intention of a fair control, I shall prefer a second viewpoint where all actions which have been enabled in the uncontrolled system have to get their chance.
Combinations of controls are considered under the view point of simultaneous controls, and under the view point of successive refinements, respectively.
The global effects of individual (agent) controls for the whole multi-agent systems are investigated using the formalism of simultaneous controls. Vice versa, the faithful distribution of global controls to individual ones requires additional conditions or additional communication.
The following notions are used: The set of all finite sequences over a set (alphabet) T is denoted by T*, e denotes the empty word. The set of all infinite sequences over T is denoted by Too. I denote the number of occurrences of a symbol t E T in the sequence w E T" U Tm (Pa&h vector) by rc,(t). 3" denotes "for infinitely many". The prefix relations are denoted by C and c. The set of all prefixes of a (finite or infinite) sequence w is denoted by Pref (w). For a set M of sequences the set of all prefixes of these sequences is denoted by Pref (M).
Definition of multi-agent systems
Fairness properties and controls are defined with respect to the behaviour of a system. The behaviour of a system is built up from atomic actions (or events). These actions can occur sequentially and concurrently. Different calculi have been developed for formalizing concurrent behaviour (cf. e.g. [ 16, 21, 20] ), but the simple approach of nondeterministic interleaving and a description using action sequences is sufficient for the purposes of this paper.
An important question concerns the problem what is called an "atomic" action/event. Since the formalism is based on the interleaving semantics, the mixture of choice (an agent u decides between different of her possible actions), chance (from viewpoint of a: occurrences of someone else's actions or environmental events change her possibilities) and concurrency (concurrent actions are described by arbitrary interleaving) must be used carefully. Similar problems are already known for concurrent systems: some actions must be considered indivisible (e.g. for metaphors), while others must be split up to obtain a useful description (cf. the LCR-restriction discussed in [20] ).
As in [4] the system behaviour is described by a prefix closed language L c T*, where T is the finite set of atomic actions. A sequence p E L describes a possible sequence (history) of actions. Concurrent actions appear in a nondeterministically chosen order. Since each prefix of such a sequence is also a possible behaviour of the system, the language L is prefix closed. Note that states are implicitly present by the histories: Given an initial state and a sequence of actions, the resulting state can be computed if a transition table is known.
I denote a finite set of agents by A. Each agent a E A has a set T, of its individual actions. This is reflected by the following definition of multi-agent systems (MAS).
Definition 1. A MAS is given by A4 = [A, T, z,L] where
A is a finite set of agents, T is a finite set of all actions/events occurring in M, r is a mapping from A into the powerset 2T of T where T, := z(a) is the set of all actions/events from T which are connected with agent a E A (I suppose T = U{ T,/a E Al), L is a prefix closed subset of T" which describes the behaviour of the MAS.
The sets T, define the restricted knowledge and the restricted influence of the agents a with respect to the whole system. In general I do not suppose that the sets T, have to be disjoint. Thus, actions or events shared by different agents can be denoted by the same element t.
The interpretation of t as an action (an agent is "actively" doing something) or as an event (an agent is more passive, i.e. by observing something) is left open. Thus, if an agent a is doing an action t while b observes this action, this may be described by t E T, and t E Tb. Later on one may distinguish between "active" and "passive" actions of an agent, such that an agent is able to control only its active actions, while the passive actions (e.g. observations) are controlled from somewhere outside of this agent.
It is a question of useful/realistic models, how the sets of "active", "observable", "non-observable", 'unknown" (etc.) actions are defined for the agents. Again, the situation is similar to interleaving semantics in concurrent systems where a faithml description is necessary to get reasonable results [20] . Additional requirements may be necessary for multi-agent systems. The problem of a "faithful" description of agent behaviour was discussed to some extent in [7] . For the purposes of this paper, the sets T, are sulhcient.
Following these intentions about the sets T,, I define the behaviour of the agents a in a MAS by the projections of L to the sets T,. In a related sense, the consecutions of the agents (needed for the hierarchical controls mentioned above) are defined over A*.
Definition 2. Let A4 = [A, T, z, L] be a MAS, and a E A.
(1) The behaviour of a in M is given by
where h, is a homomorphism erasing all t @ T,, i.e. for t E T: h,(t) := if t E T, then t else e.
(2) The consecutions of the agents are given by
where hA is the homomorphism which assigns to each action t its owner(s), i.e., hA is defined by hA(t) := (a/t E T,}.
Fairness in m~ti-agent systems
Fairness properties express that each action (or each enabled action) will eventually proceed and not be delayed for ever. There are different approaches to define fairness with different meanings (cf. [ 1, 12, 18, 20] ). In this paper the notion of (strong) fairness is investigated, where an action which is infinitely often enabled must not be delayed forever. This understanding of fairness differs from other fairness notions where some "fair distribution" of some "values" is investigated as in [ 11,271. In my paper, fairness concerns the infinite behaviour of a system, which is given by the adherence: According to this definition I define fair MAS and fair agents as follows (cf. [7] for a more detailed discussion of the definitions and propositions in this section):
Regarding an agent as an autonomous entity, local fairness is preferable since global fairness reflects the behaviour of the whole system. It turns out that both notions are incomparable. Furthermore, global fairness of the agents coincides with system fairness, while local fairness does not {77. In the consequence, the analysis of system fairness cannot be done locally by analysing the individual (local) fairness properties of the agents. This can be inter-preted as a hint that local fair controls of the agents need not result in fairness of the whole system. A positive result holds for an "hierarchical" approach using the consecutions of the agents [7] : 
Since LA is fair, we get x&A') = CO. Hence, w, := h,(w) is infinite for all a E A'. Since all a E A are locally fair we obtain n,(t) = nnho(,)(t) = cc which completes the proof. 0
Controls
Let us start with some considerations concerning arbitrary systems (they are valid for MAS and for agents as well; in the next section I shall discuss the special problems for MAS). I suppose the behaviour being described by some prefix closed language L over a finite alphabet X of actions/events.
A control of the system gives advices in the case of possible choices. If p was the action sequence up to a certain moment, then the next (uncontrolled) action may be some action x E X with px E L. These choices can be stronger determined by a strategy (control) 5:
Definition 6. A (global) strategy 5 for a system with behaviour L 2X* is a function 5 : x* + 2x.
The behaviour of the system under the control by the strategy 5 is then given by
Thus l(p) restricts the possible choices for the next action: After the occurrence of p the next action may be only some x E r(p) with px E L.
These choices may be again nondeterministic if card(t(p)) 22, the work finishes if
A scheduling policy for fairness may be built by queues. Thereby the choices are restricted with respect to the waiting times of the actions. While these waiting times are not explicitly given by the histories, they could be computed from a history p and the behaviour L of a system. Hence the description of a control for a single system by a strategy 5 is sufficient (not only in the scheduling example): All necessary information is at least implicitly given by p.
This remains true as long as we consider a system with a fixed behaviour description L. Using the same scheduling policy (e.g. by waiting times) for another system with another behaviour L we can come to a different strategy 5. Hence the same control rule must in general be described by different strategies 5 for different systems. This forces us to look for another description of controls.
Each control of a system with the behaviour L results in a restricted behaviour L' CL. Vice versa, each (prefix closed) subset L' 2 L determines a control for that system, the related strategy 5~1 is given by tt, (p) =JJ~ {x /px E L'}. Hence I can define following [4] : By means of control principles we can describe the controls realizing special properties like fairness, deadlock avoidance, liveness, etc. Using this notion and Definition 5 of fairness I could define the fair controls by the control principle The control principle of relative fairness w.r.t. T' in L is defined by
I shall investigate the relative fair controls for the MAS. One can also describe special control mechanisms like queues by related control principles, or (if unique) by control rules. A control rule may realize special properties (like fairness, etc.), if each controlled system satisfies the related conditions which can be expressed by a control principle. In this way we can talk about fair and rfuir control rules, realized e.g. by scheduling policies. Then we have In this sense, control rules are the more flexible notion, which reflect the changes in different systems.
Special control mechanisms like scheduling or "social laws" (cf. [9, 23, 26] ) are considered as control rules. Since they are designed to meet special properties in each system, it is reasonable to suppose that their applications in local entities preserve this properties. Hence, if distribution of controls is understood in this meaning, there is no doubt that the agents will satisfy the same properties as the system after the ~s~bution of a control rule. A similar reasoning is not valid in the case of combinations of control rules as the initial example has shown.
Combination of controls
Combinations of controls are needed in order to investigate the effects of different individual controls for the whole MAS. They can be defined in different ways. Here I introduce two kinds of combinations: parallel combination ("follow the advices simultaneously given by the controls") and successive refinements ("apply a further control to a system where the behaviour is already restricted by a former control").
Defi~tio~ 10. The conj~ction F-~&Q of two control rules rr and r2 is given by
The supe~osition F-J o r:! of two control rules q and ~-2 is given by
The conjunction of control rules is commutative and associative, while the superposition is in general not: As an example we may consider the two control rules for languages over the alphabet {a, b) :
~1: "prefer longer delayed actions, start with a." r2: "prefer a in case of conflicts."
Then we obtain for the language L = {a, b}*:
With similar intentions we consider the conjunction ("simultaneous controls") and the superposition ("successive refinements") for strategies. It turns out, that both notions are identical, Devotion 11. The conj~ction <t&r& of two strategies t;t and 52 is given by ti&&(p) =~f Ct(~)n t2b)
for P E T*.
Then we have: A global strategy for the whole system M is denoted by Z, where E : T* --+ 2T.
A strategy for the consecutions of the agents is denoted by (I, where a : (2A)* -+ 22A. An individual strategy for the agent a is denoted by a, where oa : T," -+ 2". Now I have to explain how the strategies CI and a, effect the work a MAS. Therefore I define the induced global strategies: Defi~tion 12. Let a be a strategy for the consecutions, and let era be an in~vidual strategy of an agent a in a MAS M. Then the induced global strategies C, and XC= are defined for p E T* as follows:
&(P) =of G&(P)) u V -r,).
By these definitions, an induced global strategy is considered as the only control in the system. Its result to the behaviour of an agent a and to the consecutions, respectively, do coincide with the corresponding results of ca and ~1: In the consequence, special properties of an agent or of the cons~utions can be realized in the system by the same strategy as long as it is the only control. I shall discuss the effects of interfering strategies later.
Concerning relative fairness, a single individual property is locally (!) preserved in the system. It follows immediately from the last proposition:
-rfair(L,) then (L/C,), E T*-rf~~r(L*).
Remark. The last proposition was given as follows in [6] : If LO/a, E To-rfuir(L,) then
L/C, E T,-rfair(L).
This is not correct as the follo~ng example shows: T = {a,b}, L = {a,b}*, T, = {a}, L, = {a}*. dp) = {a} for all p, &Jp) = {a,b}.
Hence

L&, = {a}*, L/Z, = {a, b}* $ T,-rfair(L).
Moreover, the definition of relative fairness as given in this paper, is related to languages L, L' with L' C L. It is difficult to interpret it for homomorphic images as in the case of L' = h,(L). Hence, related replacements have been made in the Propositions 8 and 9, too. Now we have to consider the common work of different individual strategies with or without a consecution strategy in the system M. For the combination I use the conjunction of the induced global strategies, i.e. C,, &. . . &Xr;, and &, & . . v &C,&Z:,, respectively. Hence, a sequence p E L of the MAS is still possible under the common control by the individ~l strategies cri, -, a,, iff it can be performed according to all related decisions of these strategies. If we have an additional consecution control by some a, then the ordering of the agents following p must be permitted by a.
While the conjunction of relative fair agent controls need not result in a relative fair system control (consider e.g. TI = (a}, T2 = {x} and L = {u,x}* with 61 E {a}, 
Now 303q
w : E L above leads h,(q) = r) to F'r C w" : rt E L,.
Since La/~, E T,-rfuir(L,), it holds rc,,,~(t) = 0~). Then it follows rc,(t) = co. 0
The second part of the proposition corresponds to Proposition 2 where we had a related result. In the case of control principles the problems become harder to investigate. The introductory example shows, that e.g. scheduling by longest waiting time for each agent is in general not equivalent to the related scheduling of all actions in the system. Moreover, in this case the system even may be not (relatively) fair.
Distribution of controls
In the last section I have combined individual controls to global controls. But the individual controls as well as the consecution controls cannot regard arbitrary global requirements.
The reason for this is the impossibility to distribute arbitrary system controls to individual controls as can be seen in the sequel. Even the use of consecution controls does not help in general.
As mentioned at the end of Section 4, the distribution of control rules can preserve their intended properties. On the other hand, the combination of distributed control 
for all p,
Here we have related results as in the case of analysis, where the system fairness need not correspond to the local fairness of the agents (Section 3).
The recombination of a strategy after its distribution is described by the conjunction of the distributed strategies. Thereby the recombination is in general not as restrictive as the original strategy (even with a control of the consecutions): 
Proof. It follows by the Definitions 3 and 10 for arbitrary t E T, p E T', a E A: t 6 Z(P) * t E q&(p)) v t $! T, * t E +,(P).
In a similar way we obtain t E C(p) + t E C,,c,(p). Together we have t E C(p) =+ t E Ccb;)&. . . &C~&C~,~~(p).
Z defined such that L/C = Pref((ab)oo) E rfair(L).
Then by (T:(P) = C(h;'( p)) tl T, we get of(a") = {a}, af(b") = {b}for all n E N.
Hence: Z,,,;,(p) = C,,:,(p) = {a, b}for all p.
In a similar way, we obtain C,,Z,(P) = {a, b} for all p.
Hence the resulting strategy C(,,f,&. . . &Z,,;,&C,,Z) does not make any restriction:
(2) is revised with respect to the paper [6] . The following lemma is a consequence of Definition 8:
Then (2) follows by Proposition 10. 0
The missing correspondence in Proposition 1 l( 1) arises from the fact that the strategy C may give different results Z(pl ) and C( pz) for some ~1, p2 which are not distinguished from the standing point of an agent a, i.e. for which h,(pl) = h,(pl) holds. This is similar to the effect of self-determined agents (cf. [7] ). If the strategy C does not make such critical decisions, then it can be distributed without problems: [ 131 seems to be not possible, since the agents need the related information to follow some kind of rationality or social laws.
Conclusion
Fairness is often considered as a condition to ensure termination of concurrent programs (cf. [12] ). Termination aspects as well as reactive behaviour may be relevant for multi-agent systems. Thus, the aspect of "fair controls" (cf. [4, 5, 22] ) is important.
Conflicts may arise between global requirements and individual (local) control. A framework based on abstract languages and nondeterministic interleaving was used for the investigation of those problems. It is considered as a problem of "faithful modeling" that the languages contain all necessary information (as in the case of distributed system -cf. [20] ).
It is also possible to develop a related framework based on transition systems. But (despite the more complicated framework), the state descriptions have some other drawbacks in the case of multi-agent systems (cf. [19, 8] for a discussion of that topic).
The framework of abstract languages is also useful for the investigation of interacting goals and intentions: Notions from the book [3] can be formalized for MAS, including formal differences between goals (desires) and intentions [8] .
A formalism was presented for describing global and individual controls. It was especially used to investigate fair controls and their interactions in multi-agent systems.
For the example of (relative) fair controls it was shown that individual controls of the agents are not sufficient to obtain system fairness. The use of some kind of "hierarchical" control can be understood as a compromise where the global level may be realized by certain social laws. There are investigations of social laws in the form of behaviour rules ("high level protocols"). These rules are to be programmed for all agent implementations by agreement of the programmers. Design and evaluation of such protocols may use results from game theory (cf. [23] ). Other approaches are related to the evolution of social laws [26] , and to contributions from social sciences [91.
Distribution of a global control strategy to individual strategies preserves the properties of the former one only under special conditions. Such conditions can be replaced by additional communications.
